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ABSTRACT:
We consider a dynamic social network model in which agents play repeated
games in pairings determined by a stochastically evolving social network. In-
dividual agents begin to interact at random, with the interactions modeled as
games. The game payoffs determine which interactions are reinforced, and the
network structure emerges as a consequence of the dynamics of the agents’
learning behavior. We study this in a variety of game-theoretic conditions and
show that the behavior is complex and sometimes dissimilar to behavior in the
absence of structural dynamics. We argue that modeling network structure as
dynamic increases realism without rendering the problem of analysis intractable.
1 Introduction
Pairs from among a population of ten individuals interact repeatedly. Perhaps
they are cooperating to hunt stags and rabbits, or coordinating on which concert
to attend together; perhaps they are involved in the somewhat more antagonis-
tic situation of bargaining to split a fixed payoff, or attempting to escape the
undesirable but compelling equilibrium of a Prisoner’s Dilemma. As time pro-
gresses, the players adapt their strategies, perhaps incorporating randomness in
their decision rules, to suit their environment. But they may also exert control
over their environment. The players may have choice over the pairings, though
not perfect information about the other players. They may improve their lot in
two different ways. A child who is being bullied either learns to fight better, or
to run away. Similarly, a player who obtains unsatisfactory results may choose
either to change strategies or to change associates. Regardless of whether the
interactions are mostly cooperative or mostly antagonistic, it is natural and de-
sirable to allow evolution of the social network (the propensity for each pair to
interact) as well as the individuals’ strategies.
We build a model that incorporates both of these modes of evolution. The
idea is simple.
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(*)
Individual agents begin to interact at random. The interactions are
modeled as games. The game payoffs determine which interactions
are reinforced, and the social network structure emerges as a conse-
quence of the dynamics of the agents’ learning behavior.
As the details of the specific game and the reinforcement dynamics vary, we
then obtain a class of models. In this paper we treat some simple reinforcement
dynamics, which may serve as a base for future investigation.
The idea of simultaneous evolution of strategy and social network appears to
be almost completely unexplored. Indeed, the most thoroughly studied models
of evolutionary game theory assume mean-field interactions, where each indi-
vidual is always equally likely to interact with each other. Standard treatments
of evolutionary game dynamics (1,2) operate entirely in this paradigm. This is
due, to a large extent, to considerations of theoretical tractability of the model.
Models have been introduced that allow the agents some control over their
choice of partner (3), but the control is still exerted in a mean-field setting: one
chooses between the present partner and a new pick at random from the whole
population.
Evolutionary biologists know that evolutionary dynamics can be affected by
non-random encounters or population structure, as in Sewall Wright’s models
of assortative mating (4). Wright (5) already realized that positive correlation
of encounters could provide an account of evolution of altruism. Thus the need
for social network models has been long recognized.
When the social network is modeled, it is almost always static4. Interactions,
for example, may be posited to occur only between players whose locations
are close, according to some given spatial data. Biological models in which
encounters are governed by spatial structure have become increasingly frequent
in the 1990’s; see for example the work of Durrett, Levin and Neuhauser (7,8,9).
A similar hypothesis of spatial structure, in a game theory context, arises in (10).
Here, technology from statistical mechanics is adapted to the analysis of games
whose interactions take place between neighbors in a grid.
A number of recent investigations by game theorists, some directly inspired
by biological models, have shown that the dynamics of strategic interaction can
be strikingly different if interaction is governed by some spatial structure, or
more generally, some graph structure (11,12,13). For instance, one-shot Pris-
oner’s Dilemma games played with neighbors on a circle or torus allows cooper-
ation to evolve in a way that the random encounter model does not. The spatial
or graph structure can be important in determining which equilibria are possi-
4An exception, perhaps, is a preprint we have recently encountered by Jackson and Watts
(6)
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ble, whether repeated interactions can be expected to converge to equilibrium,
and if so, how quickly convergence takes place (14).
Since the outcome of a repeated game may vary with the choice of network
model, it is important to get the network model right. Further progress in the
theory of games and adaptive strategies would be greatly enhanced by a theory
of networks of social interaction. In particular, it would be desirable to have a
framework within which models may be developed that are both tractable, and
plausible as a mechanism governing interactions among a population of agents
seeking to improve their lot.
When the network changes much more slowly than do the strategies of in-
dividuals, it is reasonable to model the social network by a structure which is
fixed, though possibly random. The question of realistically modeling the ran-
domness in such a case is taken up in a number of papers, of which a recent
and well known example is the “small world” model (15). In the other extreme
(16,17,18) evolution of social structure is modeled by agents moving on a fixed
graph in the absence of strategy dynamics.
In the general case, however, interaction structures are fluid and evolve in
tandem with strategy. What is required here is a dynamics of interaction struc-
ture to model how social networks are formed and modified. We distinguish
this structure dynamics from the strategic dynamics by which individuals change
their individual behaviors or strategies.
In this paper we introduce a simple, additive model for structure dynam-
ics, and explore the resulting system under several conditions: with or without
discounting of the past, with or without added noise, and in the presence or ab-
sence of strategic dynamics. Common to all our models is a stochastic evolution
from a (usually symmetric) initial state. Individuals in a population start out
choosing whom to interact with at random, then modify their choices according
to how their choice is reinforced, and the process is repeated. An infinite variety
of such models is possible. We will consider only a few basic models, meant to
illustrate that rigorous results on structure dynamics are not out of reach, and
that further inquiry will be profitable.
We first consider a baseline case of uniform reinforcement. Here, any choice
of partner is reinforced as strongly as any alternative choice would have been. In
other words, the interaction game between any pair of players always produces
a constant reward or punishment. One might expect that such cases would not
lead to interesting dynamics, but that is far from the truth. We show both by
computer simulation and analytically how structure emerges spontaneously even
in these cases. Since the strategic dynamics here are trivial, the baseline case is
intended mostly as a building block on which more interesting strategic dynam-
ics are to be grafted. We note, however, that the constant reward game is not
completely unreasonable. Studies have shown that in the absence of other envi-
ronmental attributes, sheer familiarity brings about positive attitudinal change
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(19). In fact, an abstract model of network evolution under uniform positive re-
weighting has appeared before under the name of “Reinforced Random Walk”
(20).
Next, we move to the case where players of different types play a non-trivial
game and are reinforced by the payoffs of the game. Here, we examine the co-
evolution of behavior and structure when the structural dynamics and strate-
gic dynamics are both operative. The relative speeds of structural dynamics
and strategic dynamics affect which equilibrium is selected in the game. In
particular, this can determine whether the risk-dominant or payoff-dominant
equilibrium is selected.
2 Making friends: a baseline model of uniform
reinforcement
2.1 Friends I: asymmetric weights
Each morning, each agent goes out to visit some other agent. The choice of
whom to visit is made by chance, with the chances being determined by the
relative weights each agent has assigned to the others. For this purpose, agent
number i has a vector of weights 〈wi1, . . . , win〉 that she assigns to other players
(assume wii = 0). Then she visits agent j with probability
Prob(agent i visits j) =
wij∑
k wik
. (1)
Here we are interested in a symmetric baseline model, so we will assume that all
initial weights are 1. Initially, for all agents, all possible visits are equiprobable.
Every agent is treated nicely on her visit and all are treated equally nicely.
They each get a reinforcement of 1. Each agent then updates her weight vector
by adding 1 to the weight associated with the agent that she visited. Her
probabilities for the next round of visits are modified accordingly. At each
stage we have a matrix pij of probabilities for i to visit j. Do these probabilities
converge, and if so to what?
Given all the symmetry built into the starting point and the reinforcement,
it is perhaps surprising that all sorts of structure emerge. Here is a description
of a simulated sample run of length 1,000. The probabilities, to two decimal
places, seem to converge after a few hundred rounds of visits, to a matrix that
is anything but uniform (and to a different matrix each time the process is run
from the initial, symmetric weights). There is one agent, A, who visits another
agent, B, more than half the time. There is no reciprocation, so this has no
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bearing on how often B visits A, and in fact most agents will not visit any one
agent more than a third of the time.
In the analysis section, we show that this outcome is typical.
Theorem 1 The probability matrix for Friends I with n players will converge
to a random limit p as time goes to infinity. The distribution of the limit is that
the rows of p are independent, each having Dirichlet distribution (ignoring the
zero entry on the diagonal) whose parameters are n− 1 ones.
Thus we see spontaneous emergence of structure. This type of simple model
has been used before in the economics literature to explain the stabilization of
market shares at seemingly random equilibria, due to random reinforcement in
the early phases of growth of an industry (21). We remark that the choices
made by each agent are independent of the choices made by each other agent,
so the social aspect of the model is somewhat degenerate and the model may
be viewed as a model of individual choice. Nevertheless, it fits our definition of
social network model in that it gives a probabilistic structure to interactions;
one may then extend the model so the interactions are nontrivial games.
2.2 Friends II: symmetrized reinforcement
Suppose now that the interaction is as pleasant to the host as the visitor. Thus
when agent i visits agent j, we add 1 to both wij and wji. A typical outcome
for 10 agents after 1,000 rounds of visits looks similar to the table for Friends
I, except that the entries are nearly symmetric. There are, however, subtle
differences that may cause the two models to act very differently when strategic
dynamics are introduced. To see these differences, we describe what is typically
observed after 10 runs of a simulation of Friends II to time 1,000 for a set
of three agents, this being the minimum population size for which structural
dynamics are interesting. What we see typically is one or two runs in which
each players visits are split evenly (to two decimal places) between the others.
We see another several runs that are close to this. We see one run or so in which
two agents nearly always visit the third agent, which splits its time among the
other two. The remaining runs give something between these extreme outcomes.
What may not be apparent from such data is that the limiting weights for
Friends II are always 1/2. Only a small fraction of sample outcomes decisively
exhibit the proven limiting behavior. The data, in other words, show that after
1,000 iterations, the weights may still be far from their limiting values; when
this is the case, one of the three agents is largely ignored by the other two, and
visits each of the other two herself equally often. Since the lifetime of many
adaptive games is 1,000 rounds or fewer, we see that limiting behavior may
not be a good guide to behavior of the system on time scales we are interested
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in. The analysis section discusses both limiting results for this model and finite
time behavior. When the population size is more than 3, the weights will always
converge, but the limit is random and restricted to the subspace of symmetric
matrices. Again, convergence of the weights to their limiting values is slower
than in the non-reciprocal game of Friends I.
Theorem 2 The probability matrix pij for Friends II with n players converges
to random limit p as time goes to infinity. If n = 3, the limit is the matrix all of
whose off-diagonal entries are 1/2. In general, the limit may be any symmetric
matrix whose rows sum to 1; that is, the closed support of the random limit is
the entire subspace of symmetric stochastic matrices.
2.3 Analysis of Friends I and II
To fit this in the framework of (∗), construct the following degenerate games.
Each of the two players has only one strategy, and the payoff matrix is as follows.
Friends I Host
Visitor (1, 0)
Friends II Host
Visitor (1, 1)
The weights wij are initialized to 1 for i 6= j, and are then updated according
to
wij(t+ 1) = wij(t) + u(i, j; t) (2)
where wij(t) is the weight agent i gives to agent j at time t and u(i, j; t) is the
payoff of the game played at time t between visitor i and host j (and zero if this
visit did not occur at time t). This, together with specification of the visitation
probabilities in equation (1), defines the model. Changing the initial weights
does not affect the qualitative behavior of any model, so there is no need to vary
the initialization.
For Friends I, the updating of the weights for any one agent is the same as
a Po´lya urn process (22). Each agent can be thought of as having an urn with
balls of n− 1 colors, one color representing each other agent. Initially there is
one ball of each color in the urn. The agent picks a ball at random, indicating
whom she should visit, then returns it to the urn along with an extra ball of the
same color. The urns belonging to different agents are statistically independent.
The analysis of this process is well known (23, Chapter 4). It is easy to show
that the sequence of draws for each agent is exchangeable, that is, permuting a
sequence does not change its probability. Hence by the de Finetti representation
theorem, the random sequence of draws from an urn is equivalent to a mixture of
multinomial processes, that is, of sequences of independent draws. The mixing
measure is easily seen to be Dirichlet. Consequently, the visiting probabilities
converge with probability one, but they can converge to anything. That they
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converge to the uniform vector, where each agent has equal probability to visit
each other, has prior probability zero.
Furthermore, convergence to the limiting probability matrix is quite rapid.
Let p(t) denote the matrix whose (i, j)-entry is pij(t). Then exchangeability
implies that, conditional on the limit matrix p = limt→∞ p(t), the sequence of
visits is a sequence of independent, identically distributed draws from the limit
distribution. Thus at time t, the central limit theorem implies that p(t) − p is
t−1/2 times a multivariate normal.
For Friends II, exchangeability fails. This is not surprising, since the property
of exchangeability is not very robust. More surprising, however, is that the
sequence of probability matrices p(t) does not form a martingale. To explain
this terminology, let Et denote the expectation conditioned on the values at
time t. A simple computation shows that for Friends I, the expected value of
pij(t+ 1) conditioned on the time t value is equal to pij(t): since wij increases
only when i visits j, we have
Etpij(t+ 1) = Et
n∑
k=1
pik(t)
wij + δjk
1 +
∑n
l=1 wil(t)
=
wij(t) + pij(t)
1 +
∑n
l=1 wil(t)
= pij(t) .
Even without exchangeability, the martingale convergence theorem (24, Sec-
tion 4.2) implies convergence of the quantities pij , though it says very little
about the limit.
For Friends II the complete analysis may be found in (25). Here is an outline
of what is found there. A computation similar to the one for Friends I shows
that
Etp(t+ 1) = p(t) +
1
t
F (p(t))
where F is a certain function on symmetric n by n matrices. In other words, the
random sequence of matrices {p(t) : t = 1, 2, . . .} is a stochastic approximation
in the sense of Robbins and Monro (26), driven by the vector field F . General
results of (27) and (28) now imply that p(t) converges to the set where F
vanishes. To show that p(t) always converges to a single point, Pemantle and
Skyrms (25) compute a Lyapunov function for F , that is, a function V for which
∇V · F < 0 with equality only when F = 0. This, together with an efficiency
inequality (bounding the angle between f and ∇V away from ninety degrees),
establish convergence of p. The remainder of Theorem 2 is then established by
showing the only stable zeros of the vector field F are the symmetric matrices
with row sums all equal to 1, and that the possible limit points of p(t) are
exactly the stable equilibria of the flow determined by F .
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Determination of the rate of convergence of p(t) to its limit is somewhat
different in this case. Due to the presence of unstable equilibria from the flow
determined by F , there is a possibility of being stuck near one of these equi-
libria for a long time before eventually following the flow to one of the stable
equilibria. For the three player game, the unstable equilibria are the following
three matrices:
 0
1
2
1
2
0 0 1
0 1 0



 0 0 11
2
0 1
2
1 0 0



 0 1 01 0 0
1
2
1
2
0

 .
These correspond to cases where one of the three agents is entirely ignored,
and splits her visits equally between the other two. The probability that p(t)
is within ǫ of one of these traps is roughly 3ǫt−1/3, so with t = 1, 000 we find
a reasonably high probability that p(1000) is not near the uniform probability
matrix but is instead still near one of the unstable equilibria. This persists with
reasonable probability well beyond t = 106. For greater population sizes similar
phenomena apply. Convergence to the invariant set is relatively slow. However,
for large populations, say 20 or more, another phenomenon takes place. The
portion of the space of possible p matrices that are within ǫ of the possible
limits goes to 1; this is known as the concentration of measure phenomenon
(29). Thus it becomes very unlikely to get stuck initially far away from the
limit, simply because the initial randomness will very likely lead to a point very
near a possible limit. Thus for large populations, the dynamics appear very
similar to the dynamics for Friends I.
3 Making enemies
Let us change the “Making Friends” model in just one way. Instead of being
rewarded, agents are punished; instead of uniformly positive interactions, we
have uniformly negative ones:
Enemies I Host
Visitor (−1, 0)
Enemies II Host
Visitor (−1,−1)
Instead of interactions being reinforcing, we take them as inhibiting. The
dynamics of inhibition might be modeled in a number of ways. Continuing to use
the update equation (2) will not work because the weights will end up becoming
negative and the visitation probabilities in equation (1) will be meaningless. In
this section we explore two other possible rules for updating the weights so as to
inhibit past behavior. With negative reinforcement, it is easy to predict what
will happen: the social network always becomes uniform, and the dynamics
are not sensitive to the particular updating mechanism. Indeed this is what
happens. Since there are no surprises, and since this model is just a building
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block for a model with both structural and strategic dynamics, we keep the
discussion brief.
3.1 The transfer model
Consider a three player model with the following update rule on the weights.
Initial weights are all positive integers. When i visits j, the weight wij is
diminished by 1 and the weight wik, k 6= i, j, is increased by 1. This is equivalent
to the Ehrenfest model of heat exchange between two bodies (30). In the original
Ehrenfest model there are two urns. A ball is drawn at random from among all
balls in both urns and transferred to the other urn. The distribution of balls
tends to the binomial distribution, where each ball is independently equally
likely to be in either urn. In Making Enemies, with transfer dynamics and three
players, each player may be thought of as having such a pair of urns. The urns
are independent.
Since the number of balls is fixed, an Ehrenfest urn is a Markov chain with
a finite number of states, where the states consist of distributions over the two
urns. For example, if there are only two balls, then there are three states, S1,
S2 and S3, corresponding to urn cardinalities of (2, 0), (1, 1) and (0, 2). The
transition matrix for this Markov chain is
 0 1 01
2
0 1
2
0 1 0


and the unique stationary vector is (1/4, 1/2, 1/4). In contrast to the Po´lya
urn, we do not have convergence of the conditional probabilities of visits at
each stage given the present: at any time, given the present composition, the
probability of a given visit may be 0 , 1/2 or 1, depending on the composition
of the urns belonging to the visitor. However, if the number of balls, N is
large, approximately equal visiting probabilities are very likely in the following
sense. The invariant distribution is binomial, which is concentrated around
nearly even distributions when the number of balls is large. Thus with high
probability, no matter what the initial state, after roughly N logN/2 steps (31),
the composition of an urn with N balls will be close to a draw from a binomial
distribution. The conditional probability of either of the two possible visits, will
therefore be close to 1/2, and will tend to remain there with high probability.
Kac (32) uses these properties to resolve the apparent paradoxes that beset
Bolzmann’s discussion of irreversibility in statistical mechanics.
3.2 The resistance model
The transfer model allows for a finite cumulative amount of negative reinforce-
ment, and indeed yields a finite Markov chain. Let us explore a rather different
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model, termed the resistance model, in which negative payoffs generate resis-
tance. Initially every choice has resistance 1. The magnitude of a negative
payoff is added to its associated resistance, so the equation (2) becomes
wij(t+ 1) = wij(t) + |u(i, j; t)| .
In the case at hand, when all payoffs are negative, the probability of i visiting
j is proportional to the reciprocal of the resistance:
pij = Prob(agent i visits j) =
1/wij∑n
k=1 1/wik
with 1/wii = 0 by convention. The dynamics of Enemies I and Enemies II under
resistance dynamics are easy to describe.
Theorem 3 For Enemies I or Enemies II, from any initial conditions, the
probability matrix p(t) converges to the uniform probability matrix p where pij =
1/(n − 1) for any i 6= j. The of convergence is rapid: of order N logN if the
initial resistances are of order N . The deviations from uniform obey a central
limit theorem:
t1/2(p− p)→ X
where X is a multivariate normal with covariance matrix of rank n(n − 1) in
Enemies I and n(n− 1)/2 in Enemies II. In other words, deviations from uni-
formity are independent normals, subject to the constraints of adding up to zero
for each individual and, in the case of Enemies II, the constraints of symmetry.
The central limit theorem may be derived from a stronger, functional central
limit theorem, linearizing the system near the uniform probability to see that
the paths
t 7→ N−1/2(p(Nt)− p)
converge in distribution as N → ∞ to a multivariate Ornstein-Uhlenbeck pro-
cess. The rate of convergence follows from standard coupling arguments.
While uniform positive reinforcement breeds structure from unstructured
initial conditions, uniform negative reinforcement evidently breeds uniformity
even from structured initial conditions. It would appear, therefore, that the
customary random encounter (mean-field) model is more suitable for Making
Enemies than Making Friends.
3.3 A better model?
We would like a model that allows for both positive and negative reinforcement.
A natural choice is to let wij keep track of the log-likelihood for i to visit j, so
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that probability of i visiting j is given by
pij = Prob(agent i visits j) =
exp(wij)∑n
k=1 exp(wik)
. (3)
In the next section we will see a property this rule has in common with rules
that discount the past, namely that it leads to being trapped in a deterministic
state where i always visits the same j.
Question 1 Is there a model incorporating both positive and negative reinforce-
ment, that is realistic, tractable, and non-trapping?
4 Perturbations of the models
In this section we add two features, noise and discounting, commonly used to
create more realistic models. We examine the effects on social structure. In
particular, these lead to varying degrees of subgroup formation.
4.1 Discounting the past
In the foregoing models, a positive (or negative) payoff in the distant past con-
tributes equally to the weight (or resistance) assigned to an edge as does a like
payoff in the immediate past. This is implausible, both psychologically and
methodologically. As a matter of psychology, memories fade. From the stand-
point of inductive logic, it is not at all certain that the learner is dealing with
stationary probabilities - indeed, in cases of prime interest she is not. For this
reason, recent experience may have a better chance of being a relevant guide to
future action than the remote past.
A simple and standard way to modify the models to reflect this concern is
to introduce discounting of the past. We will concentrate here on the models
of Making Friends. After each interaction we will now multiply the weights of
the previous stage by a discount factor, d, between 0 and 1. The we add the
undiscounted payoffs from the present interaction to get new weights. The mod-
ification of the dynamics has a dramatic effect on the Making Friends models.
For Friends I, it is immediately evident from simulations with d = .9, say,
and ten players, that the probabilities pij converge to 0 or 1. In other words,
each individual ends up always visiting the same other individual.
In Friends II, simulations show the group breaking into pairs, with each
member of a pair always visiting his or her “partner”. Which pairs form depends
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on the randomness in the early rounds of visits, but pairs always form. In
fact there are other possible limit states, but their frequency is low except at
more extreme discount rates. The set of possible limit states may be described
as follows. Some agents are grouped in pairs, each member of a pair always
visiting the other. Other agents are grouped in stars. These are clusters of size
at least three, in which one agent, called the center, visits each of the others
with positive frequency, while the others always visit the center.
4.2 Analysis of discounting the past
It is worth giving a rigorous derivation of the above behavior, since it will shed
some light on a defect in the most obvious log-likelihood model to incorporate
positive and negative reinforcement. Our derivation highlights this, although
the results for discounted Friends I may also be derived from a theorem of H.
Rubin (33, Page 227).
Theorem 4 In Friends II with discount rate d < 1, there is always a partition
into pairs and stars and a random time after which each member of a pair visits
only the other member of the pair and each non-central member of a star visits
only the center. In Friends I, there is a random function f and a random time
after which each player i always visits f(i).
Sketch of Proof: The analysis for Friends I is similar but easier, so we prove
the statement only for Friends II. With each probability matrix p we associate
a graph G(p) as follows. The edge (i, j) is in the graph G if the probability
pij > ǫ, where ǫ < 1/(2n) is some fixed positive number. Among those graphs
having at least one edge incident to each vertex, let S denote the minimal such
graphs, that is, ones for which deleting any edge results in an isolated vertex.
It is easy to see that S is the set G(p) for all p satisfying the conclusion of the
theorem.
The principle behind the analysis of discounted Friends is that the future
behavior of p is largely determined by the present G(p). In particular, we find a
δ > 0 such that from any state p, for each subgraph H of G(p) such that H ∈ S,
there is a probability at least δ2 that for all sufficiently large t, G(p(t)) = H . We
show this in two steps: (1) with probability at least δ, there is some t for which
G(p(t)) = H ; (2) from any state p such that G(p) = H , there is probability at
least δ that G(p(t)) is equal to H for all later times, t.
To see why (1) is true, for H ∈ S, let fH be any function on vertices of H
for which each value f(i) is a neighbor if i. Observe that there is a number k
such that from any state p with H ⊆ G(p), if each vertex i visits f(i) for the
next k rounds, then G(p(k)) = H . For each round of visits, this probability is
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at least ǫn, where n is the number of vertices, so taking δ ≤ ǫkn establishes (1).
For (2), it suffices to show that with probability δ each agent visits a neighbor
in H at all later times. For each agent i, the sum over j not neighboring i in
H of pij is at most nǫ < 1/2 by the definition of G(p) = H . After k rounds
of visits where agents only visit their neighbors in H , this must decrease to at
most (1/2)dk. Thus the probability of N rounds of visits only to neighbors in
H is at least
N−1∏
k=0
(
1−
1
2
dk
)n
.
Sending N to infinity yields a convergent infinite product, since (1/2)dk is
summable. Taking δ to be less than the infinite product proves (2).
With (1) and (2), the rest is a standard tail argument. The constraints on
evolution are such that G(p(t)) always contains at least one graph in S. As long
as it contains more than one graph in S, there is always a probability of at least
δ of permanently settling into each one. Thus, with probability 1, eventually
G(p(t)) is equal to some H ∈ S for all future times. This is equivalent to the
conclusion of the theorem. QED
Remark: It is actually shown that in (2), if we choose ǫ sufficiently small, we
can choose δ arbitrarily close to 1.
We now also see why the log-likelihood rule (3) leads to fixation of a degener-
ate structure. Under these dynamics, an equivalent phenomenon occurs to (1)
in the proof of Theorem 4. For a pair (i, j) whose interaction has a positive
mean, if the pair plays repeatedly, we will see wij(t)/t→ µ > 0. The probabil-
ity the i will ever switch partners, once having tried j a few times is at most on
the order of
∑∞
k=0 B exp(−kµ), where B = exp(
∑
l 6=j wil). From here it is easy
to construct an argument parallel to the proof of Theorem 4, to show that in
presence of a game with positive mean payoff, discounted structural dynamics
lead with probability 1 to fixation at a pairing.
4.3 Introduction of noise
A common feature in models of adaptation is the introduction of noise: a small
chance of a behavior other than the one chosen by the dynamical equation for
the model. This may stem from an agent’s uncertainty, from agent error, or
from circumstances beyond an agent’s control. Alternatively, an agent may
purposefully add noise to her strategy in order to avoid becoming wedded to a
less than optimally efficient strategy or structure.
From a methodological point of view, noise that does not go to zero with
time transforms the model into an ergodic Markov chain. No state is then
trapping. To the extent that the trapping states produced by discounting or
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linear log-likelihood are unrealistic, we may hope to mitigate the problem by
adding a noise component. Since dynamics with a noise term do not lead to
a single state, the outcome is usually phrased in terms of stochastically stable
states (34). A state is termed stochastically stable if the chance of finding the
system near that state does not go to zero as the magnitude of the noise term
goes to zero.
Neither discounting nor noise will affect the limiting behavior of Making
Enemies. For Making Friends, let us modify the probability rule (1) so that
in the n-player game, the probability of i visiting j is now some fixed positive
number ǫ/(n− 1), plus (1 − ǫ) times what it was before:
pij =
ǫ
n− 1
+ (1− ǫ)
wij∑
k wik
.
The effect of this is to push the system by ǫ toward the uniform point p. Neither
Friends I nor Friends II is now a martingale, and the stable set of each is reduced
to the single point p. Since this is true at any noise level ǫ > 0, we see that
there is only one asymptotically stable point. Since the qualitative outcome is
sensitive to the existence of a noise term, it is incumbent to ask with regard to
specific models whether a noise term is natural and realistic.
4.4 Noise and discounting
In the presence of a discount d < 1 and a noise term ǫ > 0, if 1 − d is much
smaller than ǫ then the discount is so low that the noise term wipes out any effect
the discounting might have had. In the other case, where d is held fixed and ǫ
tends to zero, we may ask about the asymptotically stable states of system with
past discounting dynamics. For Friends I, nothing much interesting happens:
discounting causes the limiting state to be degenerate; with noise, the system
may jump from one such state to the other, which does not change which states
are stochastically stable.
For Friends II, as long as the number of players n is at least 4, the introduc-
tion of noise does indeed change the set of stochastically stable states: it gets
rid of stars. Simulations show that pairings are by far the most prevalent states
in discounted Friends II, with a star of size 3 forming when necessitated by an
odd number of players. We now show that states with more than one star, or a
star of size greater than 3, are not stochastically stable.
Theorem 5 In Friends II, with discounting, with n players, and with noise
tending to zero, the stochastically stable states are those that are either unions
of pairs (if n is even) or pairs plus a single star of size 3 (if n is odd).
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Sketch of Proof: Let S denote the graphs corresponding to possible limit states
as in the proof of Theorem 4, and let S0 ⊆ S denote those graphs with no stars
(perfect pairings) or with a single star of size 3. The important features of the
relation of S to S0 are as follows. (1) if G is the result of adding a single edge to
a graph in S0, then G contains no graph in S \ S0. (2) for any G ∈ S there is a
chain G = G1, G2, . . . , Gk leading to S0, where each Gj+1 may be obtained from
Gj be adding an edge and then deleting two edges. Property (1) is apparent. To
verify (2), note that if H ∈ S and i and j are non-central vertices in stars of H ,
and they are not both in the same star of size 3, then adding the edge between
i and j and removing the two edges previously incident to i and j produces a
new graph in S. Iterating this procedure starting from H = G1 leads in finite
time (since the number of edges decreases each time) to an element of S0.
We now follow the usual method for determining stochastic stability (35).
Let the probability ρ of disobeying the structural dynamics equation (1) be very
small. If ǫ (in the definition of S) is very small, then a state p with G(p) = G ∈ S
will have G(p(t)) = G for all later times with high probability, until there is a
disobeying move. After a single disobedience, the graph G(p) will be the union
of G with one extra edge. By the remark after the proof of Theorem 4, we
see that after a disobedience, the graph will then relax to some subgraph in S.
By property (1), if G ∈ S0 then this subgraph is again in S0. Thus a single
disobedience followed by relaxation back to S will never escape S0. Hence the
probability of jumping to S \ S0 is of order ρ
2, which implies that states in S0
stay in S0 for time at least ρ
−2. On the other hand, by property (2), from any
state in S \ S0, there is a chain of single disobediences, such that allowing the
system to relax after each may with positive probability land you back in S0.
Thus the expected time spent in S \ S0 before returning to S0 is at most of
order ρ. Thus the process spends (1− ρ) portion of the time in S0, and sending
ρ to zero, we see that only states in S0 are stochastically stable. It is easy to
see that all of these are indeed stochastically stable. QED
5 Reinforcement by games of nontrivial strategy
So far we have only considered a baseline model of uniform reinforcement, which
turned out still to have nontrivial structural behavior. Now we examine a re-
inforcement scheme resulting from the payoff of a nontrivial game. We will
consider the case where evolution of strategy is slower than evolution of struc-
ture. Thus, we will consider the agents as divided into types, each type always
playing a fixed strategy, and see what sort of interaction structure emerges. We
then extend this by allowing strategic switching of types. We find that coordina-
tion of strategy occurs, though whether players coordinate on the risk-dominant
or payoff-dominant strategy depends on parameters of the model such as the
rate of strategic evolution. Depending on conditions of the model, the social
network may or may not split up into pairs.
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5.1 Rousseau’s Stag Hunt
Consider a two-player version of Rousseau’s Stag Hunt (36). The choices are
either to hunt stag or to hunt rabbit (hare, in the original). It takes two person
cooperating to effectively hunt a stag, while one person acting independently
can hunt a rabbit. Bagging a stag brings a greater payoff.
Hunt Stag Hunt Rabbit
Hunt Stag (1, 1) (0, .75)
Hunt Rabbit (.75, 0) (.75, .75)
There are two equilibria in this game: both hunt stag, and both hunt rabbit.
The first carries the higher payoff and is said to be payoff dominant; the second
carries the least risk and is said to be risk dominant (37). In models without
structural dynamics, Kandori, Mailath and Rob (38) have shown that only the
risk dominant equilibrium of a two player coordination game is stochastically
stable. In the presence of structural dynamics, we will describe a more optimistic
conclusion.
Theorem 6 Suppose Stag Hunt is played by 2n players, with structural dynam-
ics given by equation (1) and cumulative weighting dynamics (2) with no noise
or discounting. Then in the limit, stag hunters always visit stag hunters and
rabbit hunters visit rabbit hunters.
Sketch of Proof: First note that no visit of a stag hunter to a rabbit hunter is
ever reinforced. Thus wij(t) = 1 for all t if i is a stag hunter and j is a rabbit
hunter. Observing that the weights wij(t) go to infinity when i and j are both
stag hunters, we see that the probability of a stag hunter visiting a rabbit hunter
goes to zero.
Next consider the subpopulation of rabbit hunters, call it A. For i ∈ A, let
Z(i, t) =
∑
j /∈A wij∑n
j=1 wij
denote the probability of visiting a given rabbit hunter visiting a stag hunter
on the next turn. The expected value of Z(i, t + 1) changes according to the
formula
E(Z(i, t+ 1)|Z(i, t)) = Z(i, t) + t−1Y (i, t)
where Y (i, t) is the proportion of increase in expected weight wij due to j /∈ A:
Y (i, t) =
∑
j /∈A pij + pji∑n
j=1 pij + pji
.
Ignoring the terms pji in both the numerator and denominator of the above
expression would lead to exactly Z(i, t). The terms pji for j /∈ A are known
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to be small, while the total from the terms pji for j ∈ A cannot be small.
Consequently, Y (i, t) < (1 − ǫ)Z(i, t) for some ǫ > 0, whence
E(Z(i, t+ 1)− Z(i, t)|Z(i, t)) ≤ −
ǫZ(i, t)
t
.
Since the increments in Z(i, t) are bounded by C/t, there are a λ, µ > 0 for
which exp(λZ(i, t) + µ log t) is a supermartingale, which implies that Z(i, t)
converges to zero exponentially fast in log t. QED
Introduction of a discount rate changes this outcome. Stag hunters still end
up visiting stag hunters, since even discounted reinforcement beats a reinforce-
ment of zero, but now rabbit hunters will get locked either into pairs and stars
as in Making Friends, or into repeated visits to a single stag hunter. These limit
states are all invariant under introduction of noise. When a rabbit hunter visits
a stag hunter the loss to society is the .75 that another rabbit hunter would
have profited from the visit. The model is evidently weak here, since it allows
only one visit by each agent but any number of visits to each agent in a round
of visits. That is, a more realistic loss would be the stag hunter’s wasted time
when visited by the rabbit hunter.
It should be noted that although the stochastically stable states include ones
that are not optimally efficient, the optimally efficient states (those states where
rabbit hunters visit rabbit hunters) will have an edge. Due to the possibility
of reciprocal reinforcement, it will be easier for a rabbit hunter to switch from
visiting a stag hunter to visiting a rabbit hunter, than vice versa. Secondly, when
the discount rate is near 1, the model behaves like the undiscounted model for
a long enough time that it is very unlikely for a rabbit hunter to get locked
into visiting a stag hunter in the first place. Simulations of Stag Hunting with
ten players and d = .9, seem to show that rabbit hunters “always” visit rabbit
hunters. Due to both of the effects mentioned above, the system is nearly always
found in an optimally efficient state, even though there are stochastically stable
states that are not optimally efficient.
5.2 Co-evolution of structure and strategy
To the previous model, we now add the possibility of an agent switching states:
a stag hunter may decide to become a rabbit hunter, or a rabbit hunter may
become bold and hunt stag. When this kind of strategic evolution is faster than
the structural evolution, we know from studies of random encounter models that
the risk dominant equilibrium of everyone hunting rabbits will be arrived at
while the network is still near its initial state of uniform visitation probabilities.
Whether strategic dynamics are faster or slower than structural dynamics
depends, of course, on the activity being modeled; sometimes interaction struc-
ture is externally imposed, while sometimes it is more easily modified than
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strategy or character. Let us suppose that the investment in re-training as a
different kind of hunter is great, so between each round of visits there is only a
small chance that one of the hunters will change types. Then we have seen that
hunters always (with no noise or discounting) or nearly always (in discounted
models) hunt with others of like type. This eliminates the risk inherent in ran-
dom encounters, and allows hunters to profit from switching to stag hunting
after an initial period where they find another stag hunter. Slow strategic adap-
tation gradually converts rabbit hunters to stag hunters and the payoff dominant
strategy dominates.
We describe here the results of simulations of Stag Hunting for 1,000 time
steps, where with some probability q at any given time, an individual changes
type to whichever type was most successful in the previous round. When q = .1,
we found that in 22% of the cases all hunters ended up hunting stag, while in 78%
of the cases, all hunters hunted rabbit. Thus there was perfect coordination, but
usually not to the most efficient equilibrium. On the other hand, when q = .01,
the majority (71%) of the cases ended in the optimal state of all hunting stag,
while 29% ended up all hunting rabbit. Increasing the initial edge weights made
it far less likely to reach the stag hunting equilibrium, since stag hunters took a
long time to perfectly align, and without alignment, the previous round’s best
strategy was almost always rabbit hunting. For instance, if the initial weights
were 1,000 for each visit, under 1% of the cases ended up all stag hunting,
whether q was .1 or .01.
Once hunters largely cease to visit hunters of opposite type, the structural
evolution within each of the two subpopulations is a version of Friends II. The
resulting social structure will not be a perfect pairing, but will have each rabbit
(stag) hunter visiting each other rabbit (stag) hunter, but with varying proba-
bilities.
6 Conclusion
We have taken some basic steps in exploring dynamics of evolution of interaction
structures and co-evolution of structure and strategy. The ultimate goals are
to create models that are more true to life, and to find theoretical bases for
observed behaviors of systems, including prediction of selection between multiple
equilibria.
The particular dynamics we use here are only examples, but it turns out
that the simplest of these may deliver interesting and surprising results. Even
in baseline models where the game being played is degenerate, we find spon-
taneous emergence of structure from uniformity and spontaneous emergence
of uniformity from structure. We find processes with extremely long transient
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modes, where limiting behavior is not a good guide for predicting behavior after
thousands of trials.
The social interaction structures that emerge tend to separate the population
into small interaction groups within which there is coordination of strategy.
This separation may be complete, as in discounted Friends II, or may be only a
tendency, as in the non-discounted versions of Friends and Stag Hunting.
When we combine structure and strategy dynamics for a non-trivial game,
the Stag Hunt, we find that the probable outcomes depend on the timing. Where
structure is frozen in a random encounter configuration we get the expected risk-
dominant equilibrium outcome. But when structure is fluid relative to strategy,
structural adaptation neutralizes the risk and we get the socially efficient payoff
dominant equilibrium. Varying between these extremes can give one or the other
result with different probabilities - or may leave the group in a state where both
strategies are used. We expect to see structure dynamics making a difference
in other games as well. Indeed, we have some preliminary simulation evidence
showing this to be true for a bargaining game (“split the dollar”), and for a
simple coordination game.
There are many more avenues to pursue. As mentioned in Section 3, it
would be desirable to find a model in which positive and negative reinforcement
are present, but trapping does not occur. We have not modeled any interaction
among three or more players. We also have yet to model any explicit interaction
between strategy and structure: the choice of a partner to play with and a
strategy to play against that partner need not be independent.
One could continue adding complexity so as to allow information to affect
structural evolution, to include communication between players, and so forth.
Our main point is this. Structural change is a common feature of the real
world. A theory of strategic interaction must take account of it. There is
a mathematically rich theory which develops relevant tools. We believe that
explicit modeling of structural dynamics, and the interaction of structure and
strategy, will generate new insights for the theory of adaptive behavior.
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